

The 'Modern Spy' Extends His Arena

Although a wave of spy stories has raised questions about the effectiveness of secret agents, classic espionage is being practiced on a greatly increased scale.

CHRISTOPHER FELIX

TO judge from the number of spy stories, spy trials and espionage mishaps which since 1960 have colored the pages of our newspapers, a major "challenge of the times" lies in the field of espionage. The recent reverberations of the Vasquez case in London had scarcely died away before Moscow was filling the headlines with the Penkovsky-Wynne affair. And in the background drummed the steady obligato of arrests and trials in East and West Germany, where special spy tribunals run like office courts; of Israeli agents arrested in Switzerland for the attempted assassination of German scientists working for the United Arab Republic; in America, of the C.I.A.'s recurring troubles in running secret operations with Cuban exiles.

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Traditionally, publicized espionage is a contradiction in terms. It is thus fair to ask whether all this publicity does not indicate that defenses against traditional espionage methods have now become so effective as to call for new spying tactics. Will science develop new "spies in the sky" and other electronic miracles to answer the need for intelligence-gathering in the interests of national security, and gradually eliminate the classic but vulnerable—and so often embarrassing—secret agent?

ONE answer—certainly for the sixties and, I would say, for a very long time to come—can be found in the needs of intelligence itself. Only half the job is done when we know all about Khrushchev's missiles and troop dispositions. The other and usually more important half is finding out what he intends to do with them. Intelligence is preoccupied with both capabilities and intentions.

The U-2 flights brought back invaluable information on Soviet capabilities—but they could tell the American Government nothing of what the Soviets intended to do with the arsenals and bombers photographed. The Samos and Midas "spy satellites" and future refinements of them will be similarly gifted as to capabilities and limited as to the human factor of evaluating intentions. The last-minute warning of attack they might provide by detecting missile firings cannot compare to the value of a secret agent in the Soviet Defense Ministry who would be privy days or even weeks before to the Soviet leaders' intent to attack. (A constant danger to peace is the military habit of extrapolating intentions from capabilities. Both world wars revealed the failures of responsible national leaders to supplement their generals' peacetime estimates of intentions with sound political intelligence.)

A further answer lies in the op-

erational techniques and counterespionage techniques are either of the Soviet agent transmitter in London neighborhood to be by monitors) and messages to Moscow of broadcasting, clandestine activity are an illegal hidden but not clandestine activity agent's codes hide do not disguise the matter broadcast in Moscow is illegal as such when he is emitting en clair or

COVERT activity the reverse of clandestine, but not hidden but thought to be hidden. Where is the element reveal that the man his a "reactive" in crowded bar in New York is, notwithstanding in a big Park Avenue C.I.A. agent, and the package he presents fact contains instructions network in Cuba?

This sort of thin electronic or mechanical by the polygraph, which is a fetish (only in America). Operations is a matter of human impression: actions. It is thus only by human factors remaining the best of spy into position is by far the most technique in peacetime.

In short, so long as mankind are run by machines, a principle of espionage will continue to be the adversary's principal technique of attack. It will be the only technique of attack.

